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According to J. Hillis Miller, The Conflagration of Community: Fiction before 
and after Auschwitz “constructs a Benjaminian constellation” (xii) which jux-
taposes five topics. They include Jean-Luc Nancy’s “reflections on community 
after Auschwitz” (from which the book’s title derives); three novels by Franz 
Kafka that Miller believes “foreshadow Auschwitz”; four novels about the 
Holocaust “written by authors at varying degrees of distance from it”; and 
Toni Morrison’s Beloved (chosen because it examines “the feature of American 
history that most resonates with Auschwitz”) (xii-xiii). Miller’s final topic 
differs from the others in that it is neither philosophical nor literary. It is 
an analogy based on “the chilling resemblance between what happened in 
Germany and adjacent countries in the years leading up to the Nazi takeover 
and what has happened recently in the United States and abroad as a result of 
its actions” (xiii). This topic also differs from the others in that it is not high-
lighted in any of the headings of the book’s four parts. Nevertheless, Miller’s 
outrage at contemporary American actions is so intense that the resemblance 
he finds between what led to the Holocaust in Germany and what has hap-
pened recently in the United States resonates throughout to such an extent 
that it often appears to be the book’s primary topic, disrupting discussion of 
all others. A representative example is a paragraph that begins by addressing 
why Kafka resisted finishing his novels but quickly moves to analogies Miller 
sees between Kafka’s protagonists and Iraqis “indefinitely incarcerated, inter-
rogated, and tortured at Abu Ghraib, Guantánamo Bay, or in some secret 
prison abroad” (50). 
Knowing that readers may object to his analogies, Miller provides a cau-
tionary note: “Analogies . . . are not identities, but juxtaposition of ‘somewhat 
analogous events’ may help to understand both sides of the analogy” (xii). 
This defence of his project is persuasive, but there are other ways of provid-
ing understanding that Miller avoids. Although he reads Kafka’s work for 
its premonitions of Auschwitz while simultaneously acknowledging that this 
reading “might seem perverse” given that Kafka died in 1924 (39), Miller 
chooses a book title that does not foreground the analogy that so preoccupies 
him. He insists that Kafka’s writings are proleptic in that they “anticipate 
the Shoah” (271), but what The Conflagration of Community may actually 
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demonstrate is how much readers post-Holocaust bring to their readings. As 
Miller admits, when he first wrote about Kafka nearly fifty years ago, his tone 
was very different. But having lost his “cool, amused insouciance” because 
he genuinely believes that Americans today live in a “nightmarish Kafka-like 
world,” he reads Kafka very differently now (112). The epigraph to his pref-
ace is Theodor Adorno’s famous prohibition on poetry after Auschwitz; The 
Conflagration of Community responds to Adorno by demonstrating not just 
that reading fiction matters even more after Auschwitz, but also how reading 
fiction after Auschwitz, we cannot avoid bringing our post-Holocaust knowl-
edge to our reading of earlier works. 
At one point, Miller invokes a juggling metaphor for his approach: “I have 
in my comments on [Ian McEwan’s] Black Dogs juggled three of the four 
balls I am trying to keep in the air in this book: the question of whether a 
novel can testify to the Shoah; the question of narrative form in relation to 
whether fiction can be testimony; the question of our relation today to the 
Shoah” (166). He then adds that the subject of community—presumably the 
fourth ball—will be addressed in the next chapter. Unfortunately, sometimes 
The Conflagration of Community reads as though Miller is juggling too many 
balls. What else accounts for his need to keep reminding his readers what his 
subject is? According to one chapter, “The center of this book is the question 
of whether or not the Holocaust can be testified to by way of fictional works” 
(67). However, the density of his argument leads him to shift directions in 
the next chapter as he turns to the subject of narratology and links its rise 
to a post-Holocaust world that longs for clarity. Assessing the values of nar-
ratological modes of analysis in testing his theories of community, Miller 
asks numerous questions and provides fascinating asides prompted by his 
wide reading to such an extent that he must remind himself that he may be 
getting off track: “After all, the ‘conflagration of community’ is supposed to 
be my main topic in this book” (140). By this point, readers may well feel 
that they are themselves at risk of becoming like one of Kafka’s protagonists, 
embarked on a journey whose destination is not at all clear. On the surface, 
the “center of this book”—the question of Holocaust testimony—and the 
“main topic”—the conflagration of community—do not appear identical, 
but Miller brings them together in his reading of Imre Kertész’s Fatelessness 
when he proposes what he calls “Miller’s law”: “If Holocaust novels get more 
complex .  .  . narratologically and rhetorically, the closer the author was to 
direct experience of the camps, at the same time the rendering of the confla-
gration of community becomes more pronounced” (223). The problem with 
this “law” as he admits a few pages later is that it is based on a very small 
sample.
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Despite the acknowledgement that “Miller’s law” is only a hypothesis, it is 
one of three primary assumptions underlying the book’s argument. The other 
two, also named in the brief coda, are “That a work of fiction or a work of 
criticism can be a valid testimony to such events as Auschwitz, or as slavery 
in the United States, or as our wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and other United 
States catastrophes[,] . . . [and] [t]hat a work of fiction can, after the fact, be 
seen as proleptic” (271). However, the coda also reveals Miller’s belief that 
ultimately The Conflagration of Community provides “readings of eight novels 
that will work as adequate testimony to what happened to [him] when [he] 
read them” (271). The readings become a model that Miller hopes will “func-
tion as speech acts to instigate others to read these novels for themselves” 
(271). It is a surprisingly modest conclusion to a very complex argument.
The main strength of this book is Miller’s nuanced interrogation of how 
and why we read fiction, not just after Auschwitz, but also in an age when so 
many predict the “disappearance [of such reading] into cyberspace” (269). In 
“Community in Fiction after Auschwitz,” the prologue to his two chapters 
on Holocaust fiction—yet one more example of how the title does not really 
capture the chapter’s primary focus—he analyzes the many reasons for his re-
sistance to writing about the Holocaust. In a typical pattern where he begins 
by identifying four reasons for his anxiety, but then actually provides an ad-
ditional reason that returns him to his overriding concern with “the extremely 
disquieting similarity between the run-up to the Nazi period in Germany and 
what has happened in the United States in the last decade and is still happen-
ing to some extent today” (153), Miller finds the most persuasive reason for 
writing about the Holocaust: “Certainly this analogy is a big reason to try to 
face up to the Shoah. . . . Reading and thinking about Auschwitz fiction may 
help with that” (154; emphasis added). 
The tentativeness of that final sentence is significant, for Miller’s defence 
of reading is not naïve. He never pretends that a community of readers can 
substitute for a community that has been destroyed, and he knows that read-
ing and thinking about Auschwitz fiction may help us recognize and object to 
the American government’s current behavior, but they may not. Throughout 
his book, Miller asks what readers should do after they read a novel of wit-
ness. He asks this about the Holocaust novels; and about Beloved when he 
observes, “It is not prima facie evident that reading Beloved is any help what-
soever to bring us in 2010 to face up to our current frightening situation and 
to do something about it” (239). The “big challenge” of his book is proving 
that “[p]aying close attention to a literary work” can make a difference (243). 
Insisting that in the texture of Beloved he finds “a universal structure of all 
communities” (257) and calling on Jacques Derrida’s theory of community 
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as “auto-co-community” (262) to make his case, he concludes his chapter on 
Beloved by claiming, “I .  .  . have shown that reading Beloved is, somewhat 
surprisingly, useful or even indispensable as an indirect way to understand 
the mechanisms that govern our present-day world, the world of ‘terrorists,’ 
the War on Terror, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, cyberspace, and global 
tele-techno-military capitalism” (268). That’s a big claim, but it is one of the 
book’s more persuasive ones.
Where Miller’s argument proves less persuasive is in his generalizations 
about Holocaust fiction. He bases these generalizations and his judgment of 
what characterizes the best Holocaust fiction on his immense admiration of 
Kafka. But this produces a chicken and egg scenario in which he sees Kafka’s 
writing as anticipating Kertész’s writing yet has little interest in considering 
the reverse, that is, that Kertész’s style might be affected by Kertész’s reading 
of Kafka. As a result, Miller makes numerous pronouncements on what de-
fines the best Holocaust fiction: for example, “This not making sense is also 
represented in the best Auschwitz novels” (49); and “irony is the most appro-
priate mode of narrative language for writing about Auschwitz” (202). Such 
comments derive from his admiration for Kertész’s fiction, but that fiction 
is not analogous to all Holocaust fiction. (See Kertész’s dismissal of a writer 
who sounds very much like Elie Wiesel in Kaddish for a Child Not Born.) 
Miller admits that the “law” he constructs regarding the relationship between 
narrative complexity and the author’s closeness to the concentration camp 
experience is based on a very small sample—four “novels,” one of which is Art 
Spiegelman’s graphic novel Maus. With the exception of Kertész’s Fatelessness, 
Miller does not examine any other novels written by survivors.
Even more puzzling is Miller’s determination to read Kafka’s fiction as 
“obscurely foreshadow[ing] the catastrophe of the Shoah” (40). He points 
to the “distressingly contradictory ways of reading Kafka” (105), but this 
does not make his reading more persuasive. He even proposes that Kafka 
did not complete his novels because he feared “that they might be prophetic 
or might have the force to bring about on a large scale the individual suf-
ferings and catastrophes they dramatize” (40). This attribution to Kafka of 
magical thinking not only weakens the political force of Miller’s defence of 
reading, it also verges on the backshadowing that Michael André Bernstein 
warns against in Foregone Conclusions: Against Apocalyptic History. Nearly half 
the seven chapters of The Conflagration of Community read Kafka’s work in 
terms of what Miller admits is an “obscure” foreshadowing and of Kafka’s 
determined resistance to his foreboding through the self-censorship of not 
completing his work. That Miller sees Holocaust analogies does not prove 
that Kafka wrote in fear of his power to provoke the Holocaust. Although 
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Miller qualifies his assertions by writing that he actually “do[es] not believe 
in telepathic foreshadowings,” he is unable to abandon this thesis: “it almost 
seems as though Kafka must have had some occult telepathic premonition of 
what the genocide would be like, though he got the details sometimes a little 
garbled” (65). The “almost” invokes the precarious language of analogy; there 
is a resemblance that Miller as a post-Holocaust reader finds, but an anal-
ogy is not an identity. As Bernstein argues, history is not predetermined; the 
Holocaust did not have to happen. Had it not happened, would we still insist 
that Kafka’s work obscurely foreshadowed what nearly happened? 
Adr ienne Ker tzer
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World War II was a watershed. Before, European colonial states in Africa, 
Asia, and the Caribbean; after, anti-colonial struggles culminating in de-
colonization. During the conflicts, subaltern intellectuals gave voice to the 
colonized’s yearning for collective self-determination, a yearning eventually 
satiated, the story goes, with decolonization. Newly independent, postcolo-
nial states started fulfilling the promises of decolonization with moderniza-
tion projects and policies designed to conserve the cultural heritage. To do so, 
they borrowed, often at usurious rates of interest. To finance these loans, they 
submitted to ruinous debt repayment regimes. Local production virtually 
asphyxiated by the imposed lifting of import restrictions, national econo-
mies collapsed. Those who could (skilled professionals and the educated) fled, 
most to Europe and North America, where a few entered the Academy. But 
access to the Academy, like emigration, exacted a price. At the level of the 
Postcolonial Studies curriculum, coming to terms with structuralist and post-
structuralist theories entailed substituting hybridity and multiculturalism for 
foundational concepts of anti–colonial discourse such as the nation. At the 
level of ethics, it meant disengaging one’s pedagogical practices and schol-
